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TAX	  REFORM	  AND	  TAX	  TREATIES	  
	  
Reuven	  S.	  Avi-­‐Yonah1	  	  
ABSTRACT	  	  The	  Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  Act	  (TCJA)	  includes	  several	  provisions	  that	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  potential	  violations	  of	  US	  tax	  treaties.	  However,	  most	  of	  those	  potential	  violations,	  such	  as	  new	  IRC	  section	  951A	  and	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  new	  IRC	  section	  59A,	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  Savings	  Clause	  (US	  model	  article	  1(4)).	  The	  only	  remaining	  question	  is	  whether	  IRC	  section	  59A	  (the	  “Base	  Erosion	  Anti-­‐Abuse	  Tax”,	  or	  BEAT)	  violates	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  provision	  (article	  24),	  which	  is	  exempted	  from	  the	  Savings	  Clause.	  The	  answer	  is	  no,	  because	  foreign	  related	  parties	  are	  not	  comparable	  to	  US	  related	  parties	  receiving	  interest	  or	  royalties.	  	  
1. Introduction:	  The	  TCJA	  and	  US	  Tax	  Treaties	  	  The	  Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  Act	  (TCJA),	  as	  signed	  into	  law	  on	  December	  22,	  2017,	  includes	  several	  provisions	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  inconsistent	  with	  US	  tax	  treaties.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  GILTI	  rule	  (new	  IRC	  section	  951A)	  imposes	  tax	  on	  the	  US	  shareholders	  of	  controlled	  foreign	  corporations	  (CFCs)	  in	  treaty	  country	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  income	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  business	  profits	  and	  where	  the	  CFC	  does	  not	  have	  a	  permanent	  establishment	  (PE)	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  The	  Base	  Erosion	  Anti-­‐Abuse	  Tax	  (BEAT,	  new	  IRC	  section	  59A)	  imposes	  tax	  on	  the	  US	  related	  party	  when	  it	  makes	  deductible	  payments	  to	  a	  25%	  foreign	  related	  party.	  These	  payments	  include	  interest	  and	  royalties,	  some	  payments	  for	  services	  and	  reinsurance,	  and	  in	  some	  limited	  future	  circumstances	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold.	  Arguably,	  the	  BEAT	  violates	  Article	  9	  because	  it	  imposes	  the	  tax	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  amount	  paid	  is	  at	  arm’s	  length.2	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  violating	  articles	  11	  (interest)	  and	  12	  (royalties)	  and	  21	  (other	  income)	  because	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  indirect	  imposition	  of	  a	  withholding	  tax.	  Finally,	  the	  BEAT	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  violating	  article	  24	  (non-­‐discrimination)	  because	  it	  either	  disallows	  deductions	  that	  would	  be	  allowed	  if	  the	  related	  party	  were	  a	  US	  taxpayer,	  or	  treats	  a	  foreign	  related	  party	  worse	  than	  a	  US	  related	  party.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Irwin	  I.	  Cohn	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Steve	  Shay	  for	  very	  helpful	  comments	  on	  a	  previous	  version.	  	  2	  There	  is	  a	  debate	  whether	  article	  9(1)	  imposes	  a	  prescription	  that	  can	  be	  violated;	  see	  discussion	  below.	  	  
1
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2. The	  Savings	  Clause	  and	  Articles	  7,9,	  11,	  12	  and	  21.	  	  But	  none	  of	  these	  arguments	  except	  for	  the	  last	  one	  can	  actually	  be	  raised	  because	  every	  US	  tax	  treaty	  has	  a	  Savings	  Clause	  (usually	  article	  1(4)):	  	  
Except to the extent provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, this 
Convention shall not affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its 
residents (as determined under Article 4 (Resident)) and its citizens.3 	   	  The	  exceptions	  are	  not	  relevant	  except	  for	  article	  24	  (discussed	  below).4	  Thus,	  no	  legal	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  GILTI	  violates	  article	  7	  or	  that	  BEAT	  violates	  article	  9,	  11,	  12	  or	  21	  because	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  tax	  is	  imposed	  on	  the	  US	  related	  party	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  GILTI	  because	  of	  the	  deemed	  dividend	  rule	  of	  IRC	  section	  951,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  BEAT	  directly).	  	  	  	  Article	  9	  is	  potentially	  different	  because	  Article	  9(2),	  the	  correlative	  adjustment	  rule,	  is	  excepted	  from	  the	  Savings	  Clause.	  But	  any	  potential	  violation	  of	  article	  9	  in	  the	  BEAT	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  arm’s	  length	  standard	  of	  article	  9(1),	  which	  is	  not	  excepted	  from	  the	  Savings	  Clause.	  	  	  Because	  the	  BEAT	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  US	  related	  party,	  no	  direct	  credit	  is	  available	  for	  it	  under	  the	  tax	  laws	  of	  the	  residence	  jurisdiction.	  Thus,	  the	  BEAT	  would	  result	  in	  juridical	  double	  taxation	  unless	  the	  relevant	  income	  is	  either	  exempt	  (which	  will	  frequently	  be	  the	  case,	  see	  below)	  or	  eligible	  for	  an	  indirect	  credit,	  which	  is	  unlikely	  because	  no	  dividend	  was	  distributed.	  	  But	  this	  potential	  for	  double	  taxation	  is	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  tax	  treaties.	  It	  is	  equivalent	  to	  raising	  the	  US	  effective	  corporate	  tax	  rate	  by	  the	  BEAT,	  which	  the	  US	  as	  the	  residence	  country	  of	  the	  taxpayer	  as	  well	  as	  the	  source	  country	  for	  the	  relevant	  income	  has	  every	  right	  to	  do	  under	  the	  treaties.	  The	  obligation	  to	  relieve	  any	  double	  taxation	  falls	  on	  the	  other	  treaty	  partner.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  US	  Model	  (2016),	  Article	  1(4).	  	  4	  US	  Model,	  Article	  1(5):	  The	  provisions	  of	  paragraph	  4	  of	  this	  Article	  shall	  not	  affect:	  	  a)	  the	  benefits	  conferred	  by	  a	  Contracting	  State	  under	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  7	  (Business	  Profits),	  paragraph	  2	  of	  Article	  9	  (Associated	  Enterprises),	  paragraph	  7	  of	  Article	  13	  (Gains),	  	  subparagraph	  (b)	  of	  paragraph	  1,	  paragraphs	  2,	  3	  and	  6	  of	  Article	  17	  (Pensions,	  Social	  Security,	  Annuities,	  Alimony	  and	  Child	  Support),	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  18	  (Pension	  Funds),	  and	  Articles	  23	  (Relief	  From	  Double	  Taxation),	  24	  (Non-­‐Discrimination)	  and	  25	  (Mutual	  Agreement	  Procedure);	  […]	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  5	  Relief	  can	  be	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  exempting	  the	  relevant	  income	  or	  by	  granting	  a	  credit	  for	  the	  tax	  (including	  the	  BEAT	  increase)	  once	  the	  underlying	  income	  is	  distributed	  as	  a	  dividend.	  When	  the	  related	  foreign	  party	  is	  a	  CFC,	  the	  US	  effectively	  grants	  relief	  for	  the	  BEAT	  by	  exempting	  a	  dividend	  to	  the	  US	  parent	  or	  by	  granting	  the	  US	  parent	  a	  credit	  under	  section	  960	  if	  the	  underlying	  earnings	  of	  the	  CFC	  
2
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  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  arm’s	  length	  standard	  of	  article	  9	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  customary	  international	  tax	  law	  and	  binding	  even	  if	  there	  was	  no	  treaty.6	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  ALS	  can	  be	  binding	  where	  there	  is	  a	  treaty	  and	  a	  specific	  treaty	  provision	  (the	  Savings	  Clause)	  operates	  to	  exclude	  a	  US	  tax	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  treaty.	  Explicit	  US	  legislation	  always	  overrides	  customary	  international	  law.7	  	  	  
3. Non-­‐Discrimination	  (Article	  24).	  	  The	  interesting	  question	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  BEAT	  is	  therefore	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  violating	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  provision	  of	  article	  24,	  because	  that	  provision	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  Savings	  Clause.	  	  Article	  24	  has	  two	  relevant	  provisions.	  Under	  Article	  24(4),	  	  	  
Except where the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises), 
paragraph 8 of Article 11 (Interest), or paragraph 7 of Article 12 (Royalties) 
apply, interest, royalties, and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose 
of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the 
same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned 
Contracting State. Similarly, any debts of an enterprise of a Contracting State to a 
resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the 
taxable capital of the first-mentioned resident, be deductible under the same 
conditions as if they had been contracted to a resident of the first-mentioned 
Contracting State. [Emphasis added] 
 
Does the BEAT violate this provision? I would argue that it does not, because the 
BEAT is not equivalent to the denial of a deduction. Interest, royalties, and the 
other items covered by the BEAT remain fully deductible. Instead, the tax benefit 
conferred by deducting them is subject to the 10% BEAT. The non-equivalence of 
the BEAT and denying the deduction can be seen from the fact that denying a 
deduction would increase the tax on the deductible item by 21%, not by 10%. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  trigger	  tax	  under	  GILTI.	  The	  same	  rules	  should	  apply	  when	  the	  foreign	  related	  party	  is	  the	  parent.	  6	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Altera,	  the	  Arm’s	  Length	  Standard,	  and	  Customary	  International	  Tax	  Law,	  39	  MJIL	  Opinio	  Juris	  1	  (2017).	  7	  Paquete	  Habana,	  175	  U.S.	  677	  (1900)	  (“International	  law	  is	  part	  of	  our	  law,	  and	  must	  be	  ascertained	  and	  administered	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  justice	  of	  appropriate	  jurisdiction	  as	  often	  as	  questions	  of	  right	  depending	  upon	  it	  are	  duly	  presented	  for	  their	  determination.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  treaty	  and	  no	  
controlling	  executive	  or	  legislative	  act	  or	  judicial	  decision,	  resort	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  customs	  and	  usages	  of	  civilized	  nations…”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
3
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In addition, the BEAT can be seen as conceptually similar to a broadly applied 
thin capitalization rule. In fact, the BEAT replaces the old earnings stripping rule 
(former IRC section 163(j)).8 And thin capitalization rules, even though they do 
frequently involve denying the interest deduction for interest paid to foreign but 
not to domestic related parties, are widely used and generally regarded by the 
OECD as non-discriminatory.9 
 
The other relevant provision of Article 24 is paragraph 5, which states that a 
country may not apply less favorable treatment to an entity owned or controlled 
by non-residents in comparison with domestically held entities. 
 
Arguably, this paragraph is violated by the BEAT, because a foreign-owned US 
party will be subject to the BEAT but a US-owned one would not. But there are 
two counter-arguments. First, the BEAT also applies to payments from a US party 
to a foreign party that is owned by the US party (e.g., a CFC), which shows that 
the intent was to protect the US corporate tax base, not to discriminate against 
foreign-owned US parties. 
 
Second, I would argue that the foreign related party and the US related party are 
not comparable for applying non-discrimination analysis.10 The reason is that the 
US knows that a US related party is in fact subject to tax on the relevant 
deductible items, such as interest, royalties, and in some cases cost of goods sold. 
But the US does not know that the foreign related party is so taxable by its 
country of residence, because in many cases these countries will not tax especially 
foreign source interest or royalties. It should be expected that the enactment of the 
BEAT would lead multinationals to establish related parties that receive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Section	  163(j)	  was	  amended	  in	  TCJA	  to	  apply	  a	  30%	  of	  earnings	  limit	  on	  all	  business	  interest,	  whether	  paid	  to	  domestic	  or	  foreign	  parties.	  9	  See	  OECD,	  Committee	  on	  Fiscal	  Affairs,	  Report	  on	  Thin	  Capitalisation	  (1986).	  	  There	  was	  some	  diversity	  of	  opinion	  about	  whether	  Article	  9	  is	  held	  to	  be	  “restrictive”	  or	  merely	  “illustrative”	  in	  its	  scope.	  Some	  consider	  that	  paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  9	  prohibits	  an	  adjustment	  of	  the	  profits	  of	  a	  taxpayer	  beyond	  arm’s	  length	  amounts.	  Others	  argued	  that,	  while	  paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  9	  permits	  the	  adjustment	  of	  profits	  up	  to	  the	  arm’s	  length	  amount,	  it	  does	  not	  go	  beyond	  that	  to	  prohibit	  the	  taxation	  of	  a	  higher	  amount	  in	  appropriate	  circumstances.	  	  Note	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  interest,	  comparables	  always	  exist,	  but	  IRC	  section	  163(j)	  applied	  to	  deny	  the	  interest	  deduction	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  interest	  rate	  was	  excessive	  based	  on	  the	  comparables.	  	  Nevertheless,	  there	  was	  no	  challenge	  to	  163(j)	  as	  discriminatory.	  See	  Ault,	  Hugh	  and	  Sasseville,	  Jacques,	  "Taxation	  and	  Non-­‐Discrimination:	  A	  Reconsideration"	  (2010).	  Boston	  College	  Law	  School	  Faculty	  Papers.	  Paper	  286.	  http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/286.	  10	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  FIRPTA,	  Branch	  Profit	  Tax	  and	  Earning	  Stripping:	  Reflections	  on	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  (March	  4,	  2013).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  319.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2228082	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2228082.	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deductible payments from US parties precisely in those jurisdictions that exempt 
such payments because otherwise they would risk double taxation since a credit 
would normally not be immediately available.  
 
As I have argued elsewhere, the guiding spirit behind the international provisions 
of the TCJA is the single tax principle, and under the single tax principle, it is 
perfectly appropriate for the US to deny a deduction for items that it has no 
reasons to believe will be taxed on a residence basis.11 No violation of article 
24(5) should arise under those circumstances. 	  
4. Conclusion:	  Is	  a	  Treaty	  Override	  Needed?	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  above	  analysis	  is	  irrelevant	  because	  the	  US	  is	  able	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  constitutional	  and	  statutory	  law	  to	  override	  treaties	  by	  domestic	  legislation,	  and	  therefore	  even	  if	  the	  TCJA	  were	  deemed	  to	  contradict	  article	  24,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  any	  legal	  implications	  because	  the	  TCJA	  would	  be	  an	  override.12	  	  However,	  US	  courts	  have	  generally	  been	  reluctant	  to	  find	  overrides	  unless	  Congress	  explicitly	  stated	  an	  override	  was	  intended,	  which	  it	  did	  not	  for	  the	  BEAT.	  Moreover,	  Congress	  has	  in	  the	  past	  been	  eager	  to	  seem	  compliant	  with	  article	  24	  even	  when	  it	  could	  have	  overridden	  it.	  This	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  history	  of	  IRC	  section	  163(j),	  which	  was	  applied	  to	  “tax	  exempt	  related	  parties”	  to	  avoid	  the	  appearance	  of	  discrimination	  against	  foreign	  related	  parties	  even	  though	  no	  US	  tax	  exempt	  ever	  owns	  the	  requisite	  percentage	  (over	  50%)	  to	  be	  related	  to	  a	  US	  for	  profit	  enterprise.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  above	  analysis	  remains	  relevant	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  
BEAT	  does	  not	  violate	  US	  tax	  treaties.	  This	  should	  make	  our	  treaty	  partners	  and	  OECD	  think	  twice	  before	  they	  engage	  in	  retaliatory	  actions.	  After	  all,	  the	  BEAT	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  some	  of	  their	  own	  recent	  actions	  to	  protect	  the	  corporate	  tax	  base,	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  and	  Australian	  diverted	  profit	  tax	  and	  the	  proposed	  EU	  digital	  equalization	  taxes.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  The	  Triumph	  of	  BEPS:	  US	  Tax	  Reform	  and	  the	  Single	  Tax	  Principle	  (December	  2,	  2017).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  579;	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  &	  Econ	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  17-­‐021.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3081523	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3081523.	  12	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Tax	  Treaty	  Override:	  A	  Qualified	  Defense	  of	  US	  Practice,	  in	  G.	  Maisto	  (ed.),	  Tax	  Treaties	  and	  Domestic	  Law	  65(2006)	  (also	  on	  ssrn).	  	  13	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Three	  Steps	  Forward,	  One	  Step	  Back?	  Reflections	  on	  “Google	  Taxes”	  and	  the	  Destination-­‐Based	  Corporate	  Tax,	  2	  Nordic	  Tax	  J.	  1	  (2016)	  (also	  on	  ssrn).	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The	  correct	  OECD	  response	  to	  the	  BEAT	  would	  be	  to	  encourage	  other	  OECD	  members	  to	  adopt	  similar	  measures	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  US	  multinationals.14	  This	  is	  not	  a	  “tax	  war”:	  It	  is	  a	  long-­‐overdue	  response	  to	  the	  BEPS	  by	  US	  and	  other	  multinationals	  and	  a	  correct	  application	  of	  the	  single	  tax	  principle	  to	  prevent	  double	  non-­‐taxation.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.	  and	  Mazzoni,	  Gianluca,	  Tit	  for	  Tat:	  How	  Will	  Other	  Countries	  React	  to	  the	  Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  Act?	  (December	  21,	  2017).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  &	  Econ	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  17-­‐022;	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  581.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089052.	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